Emory Law Journal
Volume 67

Issue 4

2018

Irrational Science Breeds Irrational Law
Caleb Small

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj

Recommended Citation
Caleb Small, Irrational Science Breeds Irrational Law, 67 Emory L. J. 889 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/elj/vol67/iss4/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Law Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

SMALL_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

4/24/2018 9:01 AM

IRRATIONAL SCIENCE BREEDS IRRATIONAL LAW
ABSTRACT
Current jurisprudence regarding the subject matter eligibility requirement
for patents relies upon outdated assumptions in both philosophy of science and
the scientific endeavor itself. In relying upon these assumptions, the Supreme
Court, especially in its recent decisions covering biotechnology and computer
software, has given the arguably more technocratic lower federal court judges
a confusing and unworkable test. Scholars have proposed new approaches on
subject matter eligibility, urging courts to revisit and revitalize other areas of
the patentability analysis: utility and the written description requirement.
While these arguments adeptly characterize some solutions to the current
predicament, they do so without utilizing the full armament available to them.
This Comment proposes that by instead viewing the problems with modern
jurisprudence as a misunderstanding in the realm of philosophy of science, the
lens provided by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
clarifies such arguments against the Supreme Court’s “inventive step”
analysis. Kuhn’s paradigm model of scientific revolutions gives further
precision to what a patent should be, what the patent system should do, and
where the Court’s problems with subject matter eligibility go wrong.
Essentially, the scientific endeavor is not and has never been linear. Instead,
each discovery within a paradigm, such as Newton’s Laws of Motion, serves a
purpose within that paradigm, but is incommensurate with earlier or later
paradigms, such as Einstein’s General Relativity. Therefore, there are no
“laws of nature” with which the Supreme Court concerns itself. There is only
empirical data, rising out of and belonging solely within the paradigm from
which it arose.
Application of such a theory to modern biotechnology and computer
software patents shows that an exceedingly fine subject matter eligibility filter
is unworkable. Instead, this Comment argues that the Supreme Court should
discard the inventive step model from the last several years and focus, as some
lower courts have already done, on using other areas of the patentability
analysis, such as the utility and the written description requirements. These
latter areas better approximate the scientific endeavor because they align
themselves more closely with Kuhn’s descriptive model, focusing on the useful
problem-solving roles of scientists.
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INTRODUCTION
The last twenty or thirty years have revealed an ongoing identity crisis for
patent law. Some have correctly labeled this a problem with “audience”1⎯that
patent law jurisprudence has forgotten the intended target of clear rules. Yet
this development is unsurprising. Patent law is a constitutionally based2 system
devised by a democratically elected Congress and interpreted by indirectly
appointed life-term officials with no required background in the technical arts,
aimed at promoting innovation among disparate types of research entities. It is
therefore difficult to expect clear communication or rules in such an arena,
considering not only the sheer number of players involved, but the diverse
interests and backgrounds brought to the table.
However, developments in the philosophy of science in the 1900s have
given some clarity as to why this disconnect occurs and how it might be fixed.
The most prominent development was the widespread recognition that simple
scientific realism3—the fairly widespread notion that the goal and nature of
science is to uncover static truths about the physical world—is wrong, both
prescriptively and descriptively.4 Connected to this revolt against what has
been called the “naïve view,”5 some philosophers of science have deemed the
scientific endeavor itself to be irrational; the scientific method is a normative
construction with little descriptive purpose.6 Not only is the scientific method
1
See Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent-Eligible Processes: An Audience Perspective, 17
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 358 (2015) [hereinafter Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective] (arguing
that an “eligibility-as-king” type of analysis as presented in Mayo, Alice, and recent cases does not correctly
consider the audience of patent law⎯the community of inventors); see also J. Jonas Anderson, Patent
Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049 (2014) (examining the relationship between the Supreme Court and Congress
in the area of patent law); Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV.
72 (2012) (arguing that patent law should be tailored to its intended audience).
2
“[The Congress shall have Power] To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3
See PETER GODFREY-SMITH, THEORY AND REALITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
SCIENCE 173 (2003) (describing the tension between the intuitive view that science uncovers real truths about
the world as opposed to other theories of science, which do not view the world as a static set of facts to be
discovered).
4
See infra Section II.B.2.
5
See GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 3, at 175 (“[I]f we sever scientific realism from common-sense
realism, it becomes hard to formulate a general claim about how the aim of science is to describe the real
world.”). Even if such a view were true, would it serve us any legitimate purpose? See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 170 (1962) (“Does it really help to imagine that there is one full,
objective, true account of nature and that the proper measure of scientific achievement is the extent to which it
brings us close to that ultimate goal?”).
6
See HENRY BAUER, SCIENTIFIC LITERACY AND THE MYTH OF THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 39 (1992)
(arguing that the scientific method should be seen as an “admittedly unattainable ideal—not as a description of
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virtually nonexistent in practice, but its consistent presence in the popular view
of science has resulted in poorly devised law in areas including evidentiary
standards,7 administrative agency regulation,8 and patents.
The arena most harmed by this inaccurate understanding of the scientific
endeavor is patent law’s subject matter eligibility criterion, which describes as
patentable “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter, or any new and useful improvement.”9 Courts have turned many
corners on what constitutes these patentable subjects, and recent jurisprudence
has engendered confusion for both patentees and the patent office, especially in
the fields of biotechnology and software.10
This Comment argues that patentable subject matter jurisprudence has been
significantly harmed by naïve scientific realism, which insists upon, for
example, the existence of true laws of nature and the infallibility and
universality of the scientific method. Using the framework provided by
Thomas Kuhn and other modern philosophers of science, this Comment
examines several recent arguments for shifting courts’ focus on patentable
subject matter toward other eligibility criteria, such as the written description
and utility requirements. The “eligibility-as-king”—focusing on subject matter
restrictions over other patent criteria—trend has become restrictive and
assumes a naïve view of scientific progress. This Comment concludes that by
loosening the subject matter eligibility restriction and relying upon the other
eligibility criteria, the jurisprudence can better match the scientific endeavor
and resolve confusion in lower courts.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses current patent law
jurisprudence, focusing on the increasing reliance upon subject matter
eligibility by the Supreme Court, the wasting of the utility analysis, and the
growing strength of the written description analysis. Part II summarizes
actual practice”). Bauer does maintain that the method can be useful, but the “inadequacy of the classical view
is not widely enough known” and it is important to recognize that “[t]he corpus of science at any stage always
includes only what has, up until then, stood the test of time.” Id. at 36.
7
For example, the Daubert evidentiary standard stands in direct opposition to Thomas Kuhn’s
argument against simple scientific realism. See Edward Cheng, Thomas S. Kuhn and Courtroom Treatment of
Science Evidence, 15 TEMP. EVTL. L. & TECH. J. 195, 198 (1996) (“[T]he Daubert standard requires the courts
to do the impossible: that is, to directly evaluate the validity and reliability of science.”).
8
For a specific example of simple scientific realism negatively impacting administrative regulations,
see Stephanie Tai, When Natural Science Meets Dismal Science, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949 (2010) (arguing that
inconsistent views on scientific empiricism between courts has resulted in inconsistent application of the
Commerce Clause and subsequently weaker environmental protections).
9
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
10
See infra note 12.
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developments in the philosophy of science which have created a growing
consensus that science does not proceed linearly and natural laws are
paradigm-dependent. Part III presents recent arguments calling for a shift away
from subject matter eligibility and towards utility and written description
requirements, and concludes that the developments in philosophy of science
particularly inform the necessary changes in patent law jurisprudence.
I.

CURRENT PATENT LAW JURISPRUDENCE

For an invention to be patent-eligible, the applicant must demonstrate to
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) that the potential patent is (1) of
the subject matter that ought to be covered by the patent system, (2) useful, (3)
nonobvious to persons skilled in the art, (4) novel, and (5) sufficiently
described and enabled by a written description.11 Recently, advancements in
biotechnology and information technology have created issues for the subject
matter criterion, leading to confusing precedents and unpredictable judicial
results.12 Before discussing how the current law has become so muddled, it is
first necessary to describe the history of three of the eligibility requirements.
First, and most importantly to this discussion, the Court’s focus on the subject
matter eligibility criterion can be traced back to the 1970s, where the onset of
biotechnology first created issues in determining what should classify as a true
invention. Second, this Part discusses the utility requirement, as it serves a
potential role in solving the problems with subject matter eligibility. Finally,
this Part explores the written description requirement as a solution to issues
wrought by current subject matter eligibility jurisprudence.
A. Patentable Subject Matter
For the first two hundred years of the patent system, answering the
question “what should be patentable?” was more straightforward: light bulbs,

11
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112. Section 101 covers the subject matter and utility requirements, and
§§ 102 and 103 cover the novelty and obviousness requirements, respectively. The fifth requirement, a written
description and enablement, is covered under § 112. These requirements are in addition to and, for our
purposes, quite separate from administrative requirements such as payments to the patent office.
12
See infra Section I.A.2. Plenty of lower court decisions post-Alice have confronted these issues, and
no clear rules have arisen. Compare Intellectual Ventures Inc. v. Capital One Fin. Corp., No. PWG-14-111,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118817, at *74 (D. Del. June 11, 2015) (finding “generic hardware and software
running an intrusion detection application” not inventive or new), and GT Nexus, Inc. v. Inttra, Inc., No. C1102145-SBA, 2015 WL 6747142, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2015) (finding automation of “booking and tracking
shipping containers . . . insufficient to transform the nature of the patents”), with McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding an algorithm for video game artificial facial
construction to satisfy an inventive step).
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car engines, cotton gins, and other mechanical inventions are clearly inventive
applications of known science. But recently, with the advent of biotechnology
and computer software in particular, a “fundamental philosophical
divide . . . has crystallized at the [United States] Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit,” between those who wish the subject matter criterion to be a
coarse filter, “invoked in . . . extreme cases,” and those who take “patenteligibility as the uber-doctrine of patentability.”13 First, it is important to
examine the background of this divide. Then, recent issues in the patentable
subject matter criterion, especially as they arise in the cases of Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank International14 and McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America
Inc.15 will show how the jurisprudence has resulted in muddled and
unpredictable determinations at both the Federal Circuit and the Supreme
Court.
1. Background Until Alice and McRO
For over twenty years, the refrain “anything under the sun made by man”
encapsulated the patentable subject matter requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101.16
However, this inquiry into whether the proposed invention or discovery is
man-made misplaces the original, and current, goal of § 101: preemption. In
the context of patent law, preemption refers to a patent which covers an object
or process so fundamental that a whole field of study is closed off, or
preempted, by the restrictive power of patent ownership.17 The Diamond v.
Chakrabarty18 line of questioning resulted in confusing precedent that can be
seen in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.19 and Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,20 although in those
decisions the Court moved toward the more recent “inventive step” analysis.21
13

Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective, supra note 1, at 352.
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
15
McRO, 837 F.3d 1299.
16
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (first citing S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); then
citing H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)); see also Peter Yun-hyoung Lee, Inverting the Logic of Scientific
Discovery: Applying Common Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology
Research Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. TECH. 79, 82 (2005) (describing Diamond as the “most influential
contemporary statement of patentable subject matter doctrine”).
17
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 556 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (discussing patent
claims which “preempt the use of a natural law” and thereby shut down later innovations) (first citing
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972); then citing Whitman v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112–20 (1853)).
18
447 U.S. at 309.
19
See 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
20
See Mayo, 556 U.S. 66.
21
Myriad, 569 U.S. at 590–91 (differentiating between the ineligible discovery of a “location” of a
gene, which Myriad tried to patent, from a “product of invention,” which would be eligible); Mayo, 556 U.S.
14
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The problematic inventive step jurisprudence has centered around two
cases: Mayo and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International.22 Mayo, a 2012 case,
presented the modern conception of § 101’s description of patents as a “new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof.”23 In Mayo, as it had in Diamond, the
Court explicitly excepted “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” from patentability.24 The Court has been quick to cite Einstein’s law of
E=mc2 and Newton’s Laws of Motion, arguing that such items are
“[p]henomena . . . [and therefore] are not patentable, as they are the basic tools
of scientific and technological work.”25 A goal of the patent-law system is to
promote the “[p]rogress of [s]cience,”26 and a patent granted too early in the
life of a new scientific area hurts downstream innovations.27
The Court then developed a new test for patentable subject matter in Mayo,
saying that a patent must claim “significantly more than a patent upon the
natural law itself.”28 Specifically, a step must be taken so that the patent claims
“do more than simply state the law of nature while adding the words ‘apply
it.’”29 Only a year later, in 2013, the Court decided against the patentability of
a computer algorithm in Alice.30 This pair of decisions led to a significant
downturn in patent infringement cases the following year due to fears that an
asserted patent would be found invalid.31

at 72–73 (resting its decision on earlier cases which “insist that a process that focuses upon the use of a natural
law also contain other elements . . . sometimes referred to as an ‘inventive concept,’ sufficient to ensure that
the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself” (citing Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 598 (1978))).
22
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Mayo, 556 U.S. 66.
23
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70.
24
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 70 (citations omitted). More specifically, this excepts the above from the
“anything under the sun” rule from Diamond. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (first
citing S. REP. NO. 1979, at 5 (1952); then citing H.R. REP. NO. 1923, at 6 (1952)) (“Congress intended
statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”).
25
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)); see also Diamond, 447
U.S. at 309 (“Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have
patented the law of gravity.”).
26
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
27
For a more detailed analysis of the major harms caused by patenting upstream innovations, see
Daniel J. Gervais, The Patent Target, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 305 (2013). Gervais groups the harms into (1)
“Reduced Creativity in the Use/Development of the Invention,” (2) “the erosion of the scientific norm” of freeflowing ideas through universities, and (3) “Impact on Developing Countries.” Id. at 330, 337, 342.
28
Mayo, 556 U.S. at 73 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978)).
29
Id. at 72 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)).
30
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
31
Cf. Press Release, Lex Machina, Lex Machina Releases Annual Patent Litigation Year in Review
Report (Mar. 16, 2016), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/2015-patent-litigation-year-in-review-report/
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2. Alice and McRO: The Fight over Algorithms
In further elucidating the meaning of § 101, it is helpful to examine a few
recent court cases considering the patenting of computer algorithms, primarily
Alice and McRO. Alice presented a narrowing of Mayo’s two-step test, clearly
laying out that the first step in the analysis is to ask whether the patent is
“directed to a patent-ineligible concept.”32 The Court explained these concepts
as “abstract idea[s],” something long-deemed non-patentable due to
preemption concerns, although the Court refrained from making the connection
to preemption until the second step of the analysis.33 Turning to the facts of the
case, the Court found an algorithm for risk-hedging calculations to be drawn to
an abstract idea because of its similarities to a risk-hedging concept that the
Federal Circuit found to be abstract in In re Bilski,34 but declined to elaborate
further on the nature of an abstract idea.35 Oddly, the Court found pertinent the
fact that the Bilski reasoning rested on the idea being “fundamental economic
practice”—which sounds like a preemption analysis despite the lack of lip
service.36
The second step of the Alice framework37 calls for the court to examine the
claim for an “inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed idea into a
patent-eligible application.”38 Here, the Court does explicitly reference
preemption as a factor, reinstating the long-forgotten goal of subject matter
eligibility to protect downstream innovations from upstream patents.39 In Alice,

(finding a 15% increase in patent cases filed between 2014 and 2015, but noting that fewer cases were filed in
2015 than in 2013).
32
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.
33
Id. at 2356. “This conclusion accords with the pre-emption concern that undergirds our § 101
jurisprudence.” Id. at 2358.
34
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010).
35
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.
36
Id.; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611.
37
Because Alice has caused the greatest uproar with its formulation, I will subsequently call this
framework the “Alice framework,” even though the initial steps were set forth in Mayo.
38
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S 66,
72, 79 (2012)).
39
I borrow the terms “downstream” and “upstream” from DNA sequencing litigation. See, e.g., Biogen,
Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 105, 107 n.6 (D. Mass. 1998) (“‘Downstream’ simply refers to the
direction in which the sequence of the base components of the nucleotides is read, left to right being
‘downstream,’ right to left being ‘upstream.’”). Lower courts have sometimes referred to these upstream
patents as “essential patents”—those that are “incorporated into a standard” and therefore hold significant
blocking power in the market. See, e.g., Research in Motion Ltd. v. Motorola, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 788, 790
(N.D. Tex. 2008) (“The term “essential patents” refers to patents that are essential to a standard . . . . Once
a patent becomes an essential patent, it gains undue significance as a result.”).
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the Court found that the patent failed under the second step.40 Finding
otherwise would “eviscerate the rule” concerning Myriad’s exceptions, and
would allow for the blocking of downstream innovations: everyone uses
business settlements, so a patent on the act of computerizing a settlement
calculation would stymie growth in the field.41 Since Alice, lower courts have
consistently invalidated patents related to software under § 101,42 leading some
to call the Alice test the death knell for such patents.43
After Alice, but before McRO, the Federal Circuit decided the case of DDR
Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com.44 This case highlights how confusing an
application of the Alice test can be. It also reflects the ability of the Federal
Circuit to rest the analysis on the type of problem being addressed in the
industry, as opposed to an analysis that looks to the type of solution.45 In DDR
Holdings, the court upheld the patentability—despite subject matter
concerns—of “systems and methods of generating a composite web page” with
many features pertinent to “host” websites.46 Even though the claim was found
to be directed to an abstract idea,47 the court found that under the second step
of Alice, the claims “[did] not merely recite the performance of some business
practice . . . along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet.”48 Much
of the argumentative legwork is done by the idea that the “claimed solution

40
See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (holding that “mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a
patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”). The patents at issue in Alice covered an
automated “scheme for mitigating ‘settlement risk’” by creating shadow records throughout the transaction to
ensure that both parties perform the exchange. Id. at 2352.
41
See id. at 2358 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77) (finding that “generic computer implementation”
provides no “practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea] itself”).
42
See Timothy B. Lee, Software Patents Are Crumbling, Thanks to the Supreme Court, VOX (Sept. 12,
2014, 3:50 PM), http://www.vox.com/2014/9/12/6138483/software-patents-are-crumbling-thanks-to-thesupreme-court.
43
See CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Moore, J.,
dissenting in part), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
44
DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
45
Recall, however, that the Supreme Court specifically delineated laws of nature and abstract ideas as
patent ineligible. This makes the sudden focus on looking at the problem solved in the industry rather jarring.
46
DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1248. Inputs from customers into the program “may combine the logo,
background color, and fonts of the host website.” Id.
47
Id. at 1257. Importantly, the court notes that “identifying the precise nature of the abstract idea is not
as straightforward as in Alice” especially due to “syndicated commerce on the computer using the Internet.” Id.
48
Id. The court is drawing a clear parallel to Alice’s argument that one cannot simply perform a
calculation on the computer instead of on paper to make it patent eligible. Some have pointed to this logic as
being highly suspicious on epistemological grounds by utilizing the common comparison of von Neumann
machines to the human brain, arguing that if the human brain is nothing more than a computer, the Supreme
Court’s argument in Alice because it reduces modern computers to “calculating machines” incapable of
performing any real inventive step).
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amounts to an inventive concept for resolving this particular Internet-centric
problem, rendering the claims patent-eligible.”49
Finally, in September 2016 the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
decided McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., holding an
algorithm patent to be eligible under the Alice test.50 The patent in that case
covered an algorithm for automating a process for animating facial
expressions.51 This automation allowed for more lifelike animation in video
games.52 The court expressly referenced the “preemption concern” mentioned
in Alice, casting the analysis as looking “to whether the claims in these patents
focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant technology or
are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and
merely invoke generic processes and machinery.”53 In this case, the Federal
Circuit reversed the trial court on the first step of the Alice test, determining
that McRO’s algorithm “is employed to perform a distinct process to automate
a task previously performed by humans.”54 However, the prior art tasks
performed by humans still did not fall within McRO’s claim’s scope because,
unlike the McRO patent, the prior art did not “evaluate sub-sequences,
generate transition parameters or apply transition parameters.”55 By adding
such specific rules, the McRO patent avoided preemption of both lip
synchronization and all techniques for automating 3-D animation that rely on
rules.56
The modern conception of subject matter eligibility has bred confusion for
lower courts.57 As this Comment argues, one solution to clarifying exactly

49
DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1259; see also Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2357
(2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S 66, 72, 79 (2012)).
50
See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d. 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
51
Id. at 1306–07.
52
See id. at 1307. The defendants in the original litigation were “generally video game developers and
publishers,” giving them decent grounds from which to argue preemption. Id. at 1308.
53
Id. at 1314 (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016)).
54
Id.
55
Id. This sort of analysis resembles not subject matter eligibility, but something more akin to novelty
or even normal claim construction infringement analysis.
56
Clearly, the second of these is the more pressing concern due to its breadth. See id. at 1315 (“The
limitations in claim 1 prevent preemption of all processes for achieving automatic lip-synchronization of 3-D
characters.”); see also Robert R. Sachs, McRO: Preemption Matters After All, BILSKI BLOG, (Sept. 15, 2016)
http://www.bilskiblog.com/blog/2016/09/mcro-preemption-matters-after-all-is-there-a-split-in-the-cafc.html
(arguing that allowing for patents to avoid preemption of rules-based algorithms opens the door for software
patents to survive Alice analysis, since almost all forms of computer code operate on logical rules such as
IF/OR).
57
See supra note 12.
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what should be patentable relies on relaxing the filter of subject matter and
instead relying on either the utility or written description analysis.58
B. Utility
While the determination of whether a submitted patent can qualify as
“patentable subject matter” is the primary focus of this Comment, this section
examines a second requirement for a would-be patent: utility. This Comment
argues that the strict subject-matter advocates are wrong; courts should rely on
other prerequisites of patentability such as utility. Subject matter eligibility
analysis acts as a fishing net, helping prevent upstream patents that might
block downstream innovation.59 If the subject matter eligibility requirements
are loosened, other areas of the analysis, such as utility, will be required to pick
up the slack.
The notion that a patent must be useful is perhaps the most constitutionally
grounded of all patent law concepts.60 Early in the 1800s, the circuit courts
decided that determining the usefulness of a patent was well beyond the
expertise of judges, instead merely declaring that a patent “should not be
frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of
society.”61
Late 1900s jurisprudence matured, expressing a distaste for answering both
teleological and existential questions of utility. Existential questions arose
when the court, using admittedly constrained knowledge of scientific
consensus, judged on whether an invention was scientifically believable. For
example, the oft-cited and humorous example of Newman v. Quigg highlights
the Federal Circuit’s understanding that perpetual motion machines are

58

See infra Sections III.B–C.
See supra note 39.
60
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Promoting the “useful Arts” was identified as a listed power of
Congress in the United States Constitution; the first patent in the United States was granted to Samuel Hopkins
in 1790 for a process of making potash. See David W. Maxey, Samuel Hopkins, The Holder of the First U.S.
Patent: A Study of Failure, 122 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 3, 3–6 (1998).
61
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568). Lowell was decided by
Circuit Justice Story, an important early figure in the development of patent law jurisprudence in the United
States. Notably, Justice Story was also a fan of striking down patents based upon subject matter eligibility. See,
e.g., Stone v. Sprague, 23 F. Cas. 161, 162 (C.C.D.R.I. 1840) (No. 13,487) (finding that the method “of
communication of motion from the reed to the yarn beam” was too abstract). Justice Story grounded this
analysis in the “mode described by the plaintiff in his specification,” something that is lacking in recent § 101
jurisprudence. Id.; see also infra Section III.B. (arguing, along with Professor Timothy Holbrook and others,
that judges should first examine the specification and perform claim analysis before deciding anything
concerning subject matter eligibility).
59
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impossible,62 given current scientific understanding.63 Such epistemological
questions focus on determining whether an invention can actually work.64 One
framework, described by Professor Michael Risch, explains these
epistemological questions as “Operable Usefulness,” excluding “perpetual
motion machines” (as impossible), untested pharmaceuticals (as unworkable or
prophetic), and believable but incompletely disclosed inventions.65
Recent jurisprudence surrounding the utility standard fails to address
rapidly changing methods in the research-industrial complex.66 The modern
analytical framework considers utility under two steps.67 First, a court
determines whether the PTO “has [met] the initial burden of challenging a
presumptively correct assertion of utility in the disclosure.”68 Second, the
burden to demonstrate utility can shift to the applicant “only after the PTO
provides evidence showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would
reasonably doubt the asserted utility.”69 In addition, an aspect known as
“substantial” utility can be relevant in modern applications of the utility
requirement.70 Risch describes this substantial utility requirement as the area of
“Practical Usefulness,” distinguishing it from the epistemological questions
mentioned above.71 This substantial utility doctrine closely relates to the 35
U.S.C. § 112 enablement and definiteness requirements. The U.S. Supreme
Court has outlined that a claimed invention must be precisely delineated to
“avoid inefficient blocking patents”72 and “requir[es] those who obtain a patent
to show real technological progress.”73 As this Comment argues, the precise
delineation requirement presented by utility will allow the utility requirement
to step into the validity analysis and pick up the slack created by loosening the
subject matter eligibility requirement.74

62

877 F.2d 1575, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
This caveat will appear often throughout this Comment because of its central argument that our
patent-law system is oddly constrained by what it views as science’s role in uncovering universal truths.
64
Daniel C. Rislove, Comment, A Case Study of Inoperable Inventions: Why Is the USPTO Patenting
Pseudoscience?, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1275, 1284–85 (2006).
65
Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1195, 1202 (2010).
66
See infra Section III.C.
67
In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Risch, supra note 65, at 1203.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 1224 (citing Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 870–71 (1990)); see also id. at 1227 (“Allowing patents before a use is
discovered could impede the development of useful technical and market information.”).
73
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 175 (2011).
74
See infra Section III.C.
63
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C. Written Description and Enablement
Utility is not the only option for improving our fishing-net analogy—
catching patents that might fall through by loosening the subject matter
eligibility requirement. One of the most fundamental requirements of the
patent application is a description of what is being claimed by the inventor.75
This written description accomplishes two central goals: first, it enables
persons skilled in the art to recognize that the inventor truly invented the
claimed material; and second, it provides information sufficient to explain
what is new and useful.76
In the recent case of Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the
Federal Circuit explained that, when considering whether a specification meets
legal requirements, courts must consider whether it conveys to “a person of
ordinary skill in the art . . . that the inventor actually invented the invention
claimed.”77 Specifying what is being claimed recalls the comparison of patents
to true property rights, just as a deed to land would describe a geographical
location. The Supreme Court recently noted in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig
Instruments, Inc. that the specification requirement protects against creating a
“zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at
the risk of infringement claims.”78 Words and phrases such as “zone” and
“may enter” leave little room for doubt that the Court sees the connection
between the specification requirement and physical property rights.
The written description requirement, along with the utility requirement, can
both function as tools in fixing current jurisprudence around subject matter
eligibility.

75
See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir.1997) (“[A]n adequate written description
requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, physical properties, or other
properties, of species falling within the genus sufficient to distinguish the genus from other materials.”).
76
Id. at 1353 (“Requiring a written description of the invention limits patent protection to those who
actually perform the difficult work of ‘invention’ . . . and disclose the fruits of that effort to the public.”).
77
Id. at 1351.
78
134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (quoting United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236
(1942)). However, specification of an invention is never as easy as it sounds. “[S]ome modicum of
uncertainty . . . is the ‘price of ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation.’” Id. at 2128 (quoting Festo
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 732 (2002) (discussing uncertainties that
arise from inherently vague language). In fact, this uncertainty encourages litigation, which, besides providing
work for patent litigators, helps the patent market avoid stagnation. See Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty
and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology,
8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 211 (2001) (“[T]he natural ambiguity of a claim can (and will) be exploited in
litigation because claim construction is so critical to the infringement suit.”).
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II. WHY AN IRRATIONAL SCIENCE BETTER DESCRIBES THE SCIENTIFIC
ENDEAVOR
As previously discussed, one of the most difficult challenges in any
analysis is accurately determining what something is.79 Science itself presents
no exception to this rule. Precisely because the idea of science is so difficult to
pin down, it is no surprise that Congress and the courts have such a difficult
time creating a coherent, workable patent system.
The philosophy of science seeks to understand, often both normatively and
prescriptively, the nature of humanity’s unique endeavor of technological
advancement. This Part first discusses the groundwork of modern philosophy,
which provides background sufficient to understand the state of the field.80
Second, this Part discusses the work of Thomas Kuhn and shows how
examining the history of science results in a “paradigm” view of scientific
revolutions and change.81 Finally, this Part examines the theories of Paul
Feyerabend, the champion of irrational scientific descriptivism, and provides
evidence of the failed assumptions underlying our modern patent-law system.82
A. Progression in Philosophy of Science from Pragmatism to Kuhn and
Feyerabend
Before Kuhn and Feyerabend, the philosophy of science was dominated by
the Pragmatists, a group whose views seemed to be the natural extension of
Descartes and Hume as applied to modern science. Following the Pragmatists,
Karl Popper advocated for what he called “falsificationism,” which held that
scientific truths can only be proven incorrect; true empirical certainty about a
correlation in nature is impossible.83
1. Pragmatism
Perhaps the earliest proponents of a grounded theory that science does not
aim towards a “universal truth” were the Pragmatists. One of the central
questions asked by pragmatism is “what difference would it practically make
79

See supra INTRODUCTION.
See supra Section II.A.
81
See infra Section II.B.1.
82
See infra Section II.B.2.
83
Often, this is characterized as the “Problem of Induction.” GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 3, at 60. One
might devise a statement such as “all swans are white,” since (for the purposes of this demonstration) all swans
ever seen are white. However, unless one can know that all swans have been observed, such a statement may
never be entirely proven.
80

SMALL_COMMENT GALLEYPROOFS

2018]

IRRATIONAL SCIENCE BREEDS IRRATIONAL LAW

4/24/2018 9:01 AM

903

to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?”84 For the present
discussion, and for many of the Pragmatists, this question is often applied to
the objective reality theory of science.85 If one subscribes to the objective
reality theory, one believes that the progression of science is, for both practical
and metaphysical purposes, monotonically increasing.86
Pragmatists usually arrive at the opposite conclusion. As modern
Pragmatist Richard Rorty states: “[T]ruth is not a goal of inquiry. . . . A goal is
something you can know that you are getting closer to, or farther away from.
But there is no way to know our distance from truth, nor even whether we are
closer to it than our ancestors were.”87 More relevant to the Pragmatists’ view
of science, “[t]he truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth
happens to an idea. It becomes true . . . .”88 Thus, in thinking about patent
eligibility, the pragmatist view indicates an obvious skepticism toward laws of
nature.

2. Falsificationism
The immediate precursor to Thomas Kuhn’s revolutionary The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions was falsificationism, initially advocated by Karl
Popper.89 Popper was influential in finally turning the philosophy of science
into a descriptive, rather than prescriptive, philosophy.90 Falsificationism posits
84
WILLIAM JAMES, What Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF
THINKING 27, 28 (Frederick Burkhardt ed., 1975) (emphasis added).
85
See GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 3, at 184 (linking the pragmatists to the idea that questions about a
“real reality” serve no practical relevance: as long as our scientific theories can give us results they are good
enough).
86
Id. at 178 (“Realists sometimes claim that there is a general argument from the success of scientific
theories to their truth.”). Godfrey-Smith goes on to advocate for a modified version of scientific realism, but
agrees that an “optimism” about real progress being made to uncover how the world works is acceptable for
the realist. Id. at 179.
87
3 RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 3–4 (1998); cf. KUHN, supra note
5, at 170–71. Kuhn looks to Darwin’s discovery of evolution for evidence that not all processes need to head
towards a particular goal or truth. Science itself need not maintain a focus on an “ultimate goal,” because
“[d]oes it really help to imagine that there is some one full, objective, true account of nature . . . ?” Id.
88
WILLIAM JAMES, Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth, in PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD
WAYS OF THINKING, supra note 84, at 95, 97.
89
See GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 3 at 57–58.
90
Id. at 57 (writing that “hardly ever does a philosopher [of science] succeed in inspiring scientists in
the way Popper has,” explaining that Popper was regarded by scientists as a hero in his explanation of their
craft). Kuhn built on many of Popper’s concepts but ultimately rejected falsificationism in favor of a
“verificationist” theory in which “verification is like natural selection: it picks out the most viable among the
actual alternatives in a particular historical situation. Whether that choice is the best that could have been made
if still other alternatives had been available or if the data had been another sort is not a question that can
usefully be asked.” KUHN, supra note 5, at 145.
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that perhaps the defining feature of science is that claims are subject to
falsification, or proof by counterexample.91 This view grounds the scientific
endeavor in its epistemological roots, as Popper understood that no scientist
ever truly believes even the most fundamental of concepts are axiomatic or
irrefutable.92
B. Kuhn’s Revolution and Feyerabend’s Anarchy
Building on the pragmatist and falsificationist philosophies, Thomas Kuhn
espoused a view of science consisting of paradigms and revolutions.93
Paradigms fill the gaps between revolutions, which occur when enough
discoveries challenge the established view in a field to cause a massive shift in
a field’s methodology, goals, and language.94 Feyerabend followed Kuhn, but
pushed the boundaries of science even further, arguing that science is more
randomness and serendipitous discovery than any true method or purposeful
advancement.95
1. Thomas Kuhn’s Scientific Revolution
True scientific descriptivism took hold when Thomas Kuhn published his
Structure of Scientific Revolutions. As a historian of science, he saw that the
“truth” at any one period in time only stayed “true” until theories came along
that better fit emerging data.96 For Kuhn, the scientific endeavor is akin to
puzzle-solving, because—like the ability to solve puzzles—science involves a
“strong network of commitments—conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and
methodological.”97 “Normal science” is that which is followed by scientists at
a particular time. Normal science is not intended to find novelty, but rather to
affirm a current paradigm. However, the rules of normal science change when

91
See GODFREY-SMITH, supra note 3, at 60 (“We never increase our confidence in the truth of the
theory; and ideally, we should never stop trying to falsify it.”). Popper’s views on falsificationism changed
near the end of his life, when he began to advocate a more nuanced version that does not hold such strict
claims. See id. I anticipate this was due to him being fed up with being asked, “Are you sure you want to drive
over that bridge, Karl? You can’t prove that it will stay up!”
92
Id. at 59 (“Popper placed great emphasis on the idea that we can never be completely sure that a theory is
true.”).
93
See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing Kuhn’s approach).
94
See infra note 98.
95
See infra Section II.B.2 (discussing Feyerabend’s arguments).
96
KUHN, supra note 5, at 40–41. A paradigm also dictates what types of problems scientists can
understand in the first place. See id. at 41 (“[T]he corpuscular conception of the universe told scientists what
many of their research problems should be.”).
97
Id. at 42.
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a “revolution” occurs, shifting the science into a new paradigm.98 New
paradigms are adopted because of their superior puzzle-solving ability.99
Historical examples of new paradigms replacing normal science can be found
throughout Kuhn’s work and subsequent literature.100 A brief, relatable
example is presented here.
Until the mid-1700s, it was well established that a substance called
phlogiston was present in all combustible materials, and the reason that
materials lost weight when burned was due to the loss of their phlogiston
component.101 Inconsistencies in the theory began to arise when certain
materials—many metals—were noted to gain weight upon burning.102 In 1783,
Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier presented a theory of “oxygen,” the true material
behind the combustion process, but was scorned until a new generation of
chemists adopted the theory.103
Kuhn’s notion of progress differs quite clearly from the “Progress of
Science” referred to in the U.S. Constitution.104 Based on Kuhn’s ideas, an
argument can be made that patents overall “deter scientific exchange within
prevailing paradigms . . . [by] encourag[ing] the generation of alternate
theories that drive paradigm shifts.”105 However, this argument focuses on
applying Kuhn’s relativistic scientific model to current developments in the

98
Id. at 23–24 (“[N]ormal-scientific research is directed to the articulation of those phenomena and
theories that the paradigm already supplies.”). Kuhn’s “paradigm shift” is described in more detail as “the
community’s rejection of one time-honored scientific theory in favor of another incompatible with it. Each
produced a consequent shift in the problems available for scientific scrutiny and in the standards by which the
profession determined what should count as an admissible problem or legitimate problem-solution.” Id. at 6
(emphasis added).
99
See KUHN, supra note 5, at 23 (“Paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than
their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute.”).
100
See infra notes 101, 109.
101
See KUHN, supra note 5, at 54 (discussing eighteenth-century chemist Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier and
Lavoisier’s critic, Joseph Priestly); AM. CHEM. SOC’Y, THE CHEMICAL REVOLUTION 1 (1999).
102
AM. CHEM. SOC’Y, supra note 101, at 2.
103
Id. at 2–3. The idea that a new generation of scientists entering the field causes the paradigm shift is a
central tenet of Kuhn’s work because these new members of the scientific community are “little committed by
prior practice to the traditional rules of normal science” and “likely to see that the rules no longer define a
playable game and to conceive another set that can replace them.” KUHN, supra note 5, at 90.
104
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Peter Lee, Note, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and Progress in
Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 669 (2004) (arguing that patent scholars are preoccupied with Kuhn’s
“normal progress” and describing arguments that the patent system is currently flawed in that it “deter[s]
scientific exchange within prevailing paradigms” and hinder the changes leading to paradigm shifts).
105
Lee, supra note 104, at 669. Of course, it remains up for debate whether the patent-law system should
be encouraging paradigm shifts at all, considering that such shifts initially cause a great deal of chaos. This
discussion presumes, however, that paradigm shifts come with an increase in problem solving power in the
long run and therefore present desirable outcomes.
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field of patent law, especially those related to subject matter eligibility for
biotechnology and computer algorithms.
2. Paul Feyerabend and the Revolt Against Method
As an important corollary to Kuhn’s work, it is necessary to examine a
close contemporary of Kuhn: Paul Feyerabend. If Kuhn was a Socrates,
artfully demonstrating that the world was not quite how his audience imagined,
then Feyerabend was a Diogenes, the raving firebrand living on the street,
advising a thoroughly skeptical worldview to the point of solipsism.106
Feyerabend intended to set the scientific method on fire before throwing it out
the window. In Against Method, he argued that “aesthetic criteria, personal
whims and social factors have a far more decisive role in the history of science
than rationalist or empiricist historiography would indicate.”107 For
Feyerabend, science cannot be explained by a single model; the only rule of
science is that “anything goes.”108
Certain developments in 1900s physics support Feyerabend’s description
of science over Kuhn’s. Following Einstein’s refutation of Newtonian
mechanics, 20th century physicists have not agreed upon a singular paradigm
with uniform set of tools. Instead, string theory, quantum mechanics, and
general relativity have survived, and researchers continually argue over which
theory best fits incoming data.109 These arguments align with Feyerbend’s
writings, in which he advocated “the growth of knowledge will be better
served by ‘the active interplay of various tenaciously held views’ than by the
dominance of a single view.”110

106
See PAUL FEYERABEND, KILLING TIME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF PAUL FEYERABEND 142 (1995) (“I
loved to shock people . . . . The world, including the world of science, is a complex and scattered entity that
cannot be captured by theories and simple rules.”).
107
John Preston, Paul Feyerabend, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2016/entries/feyerabend/ (last updated Sept. 21, 2016).
108
Id. (quoting FEYERABEND, supra note 106, at 179–80 (“One of my motives for writing Against
Method was to free people from the tyranny of philosophical obfuscators and abstract concepts such as ‘truth’,
‘reality’, or ‘objectivity’, which narrow people’s vision and ways of being in the world.”).
109
Corey Powell, the editor in chief of Scientific American, wrote a beautifully illustrated and wellexplained description of this ongoing battle, describing it as “a clash of genuinely incompatible descriptions of
reality.” Corey S. Powell, Will Quantum Mechanics Swallow Relativity?, NAUTILUS (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://nautil.us/issue/29/scaling/will-quantum-mechanics-swallow-relativity.
110
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1059 (1989) (quoting Paul Feyerabend, Consolations for the Specialist, in CRITICISM
AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 197, 201–09 (Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds., 1970)).
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Much of Feyerabend’s work has been heavily criticized for its loose
argumentative style.111 For present purposes, his importance is relegated to the
occurrence and prevalence of serendipitous invention. Because science for
Feyerabend is not one idea, but instead many: insistence upon an overarching
scientific method or agenda is fanciful and unfounded; pure accident and
chance plays a major role in developing a new theory.112
This background of scientific anti-realism—from the historical perspective
of Thomas Kuhn and the anarchical, irrational perspective of Paul
Feyerabend—highlights the problematic assumptions underlying the modern
patent-law system. Our system assumes scientific linearity, yet science is
anything but linear. Our system presumes methodological certainty and
pedagogical supremacy, yet science proceeds irrationally, surprisingly, and is
anything but impartial.
III. DRAWING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN KUHN AND RECENT PATENT-LAW
JURISPRUDENCE
Conflict between the models proposed by Kuhn and Feyerabend and the
underlying assumptions of the modern patent-law system have created recent
jurisprudence that results in inconsistent rulings. Such problems are only
exacerbated by the unique problem patent law faces: the existence of the
Federal Circuit to stand in contention with the Supreme Court as the only
appellate court for matters arising under patent law.113
This Part first looks to further crystallize the connection between Thomas
Kuhn’s paradigm models, Paul Feyerabend’s radical view of science, and the
111
Cf. Preston, supra note 107 (noting that Feyerabend himself says he places more faith in believable
stories than in logical argumentation, an unsurprising conclusion given his philosophy of science).
112
See id. (“[Feyerabend] suggest[ed] that aesthetic criteria, personal whims and social factors have a far
more decisive role in the history of science than rationalist or empiricist historiography would indicate.”). Such
arguments present issues for courts considering scientific evidence, especially under the Daubert standard. See
Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137 (1995) (discussing how courts should
deal with increasing diversification in the scientific evidence arena). But cf. Deborah M. Hussey Freeland,
Speaking Science to Law, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 289, 325–26 (2013) (arguing that encouraging judges
to be gatekeepers of scientific truth in the courtroom “promotes the ability of lawyers to get evidence excluded
by exaggerating the articulated uncertainties that characterize rigorous science”).
113
The Federal Circuit is typically loath to lose patent-related cases, no matter how tenuous the
connection, to the other twelve Courts of Appeals. See, e.g., Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,
141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (connecting an antitrust case to patent law to maintain jurisdiction); Atari, Inc.
v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (denying petition to transfer to the Seventh Circuit by
connecting a copyright claim to a patent claim). But cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Saving the Federal Circuit, 13
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 350 (2014) (suggesting that sufficient “percolation” exists for the Federal Circuit
to advance, not hinder, the progress of patent law jurisprudence).
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patent-law system.114 Then, this Part presents two arguments, one by Professor
Michael Risch concerning the near abolition of the patentable subject matter
requirement entirely, and one by Professor Timothy Holbrook advocating for a
return to patent law’s true audience.115 Based on Kuhn’s paradigm models and
Feyerabend’s views of science, this Part concludes that courts should loosen
the subject matter requirement and instead rely on utility and the written
description requirement to further the goals of patent law.116

A. Patent Law and Paradigms
The patent-law system walks a fine line within Kuhn’s system of
paradigms. Weaker patent rights imply more available use of the underlying
tools that are used to conduct what Kuhn calls “normal science.”117 The
network of research tools and community research are what give the paradigm
its defining characteristic: problem-solving power.118 This was the central
premise of the Court’s arguments in Mayo and Myriad.119 Taking away the
building blocks of a whole area of research, especially a new area such as
biotechnology, shuts down innovation by giving control to patent holders and
restrictive licenses, or so the argument goes.120 But how does this relate to the
paradigmatic view of science, which at its strongest point argues that as we
shift paradigms, the world shifts with us?121 Is the Court engaging in bad
science when it speaks about “laws of nature”?
This Comment argues that relaxing the current judicially imposed subject
matter restrictions will satisfy the goals of the patent-law system and clarify
114

See infra Sections III.A–B.
See infra Section III.C.
116
See infra Section III.D.
117
The next section will show that this over-generalization is complicated by the commercial-research
complex. See supra notes 96–105 and accompanying text (discussing Kuhn’s theory of paradigms).
118
See supra Section II.B.1.
119
See supra Section I.A.1.
120
See, e.g., Patrick Hall, Patent Law Broken, Abused to Stifle Innovation, WIRED (July 2013)
https://www.wired.com/insights/2013/07/patent-law-broken-abused-to-stifle-innovation/ (highlighting the
efforts of large smartphone companies and patent assertion entities, also known as “patent trolls,” to abuse the
patent system and prevent innovation).
121
More correctly, this is the result of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis. This thesis will be expanded
on later, but for now it suffices to say that when paradigms shift, we must adopt an entirely new language to
deal with a new set of problems and problem-solving tools. Even the types of problems we consider relevant
change. KUHN, supra note 5, at 108 (“[P]aradigms provide scientists not only with a map but also with some of
the directions essential for map-making. In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, methods, and
standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture. Therefore, when paradigms change, there are usually
significant shifts in the criteria determining legitimacy both of problems and of proposed solutions.” (emphasis
added)).
115
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the system’s connection to its intended audience. In fact, “abandoning subject
matter restrictions in favor of rigorous application of patentability
requirements” will cut out an unnecessarily burdensome and confusing area of
the patent-law system.122 This argument is not limited to academics. Judge
Rader, dissenting in Bilski at the Federal Circuit, wrote that the other
restrictions on patentability—utility, novelty, non-obviousness, and written
description—are more than capable of “serv[ing] the function of screening out
unpatentable inventions.”123
Several arguments proposed by recent scholars are presented here and then
critiqued under the framework provided by Kuhn and modern philosophy of
science. First, Professor Risch’s view is presented: everything should be
patentable on subject matter grounds but remain subject to heightened
restrictions on the other factors of patentability. Second, this Comment will
examine an argument that a stronger focus on the written description
requirement of patentability will supply the clarity lacking in subject matter
analysis.124

B. Everything Is Patentable for Kuhn
In Everything Is Patentable, Risch gives three primary reasons why subject
matter rules created by the judiciary fail to achieve the goals of the patent-law
system: (1) judges lack the necessary “empirical information”;125 (2) they must
tailor opinions to a “single case,” which leads to “unintended effects” for entire
industries not currently at bar;126 and (3) judges should not be in the business

122

Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 595 (2008).
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting); see also Risch, supra note
122, at 591 n.3 (citing Merck & Co. v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156, 162 (4th Cir. 1958))
(noting that discarding subject matter eligibility as a patentability criterion is not a new theory).
124
This argument is presented most notably by scholars Timothy Holbrook, Sean Seymore, and Jacob
Sherkow. See, e.g., Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective, supra note 1, at 363–77 (discussing claim
construction as a means to address eligibility problems); Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 1491, 1495 (2011) (arguing that an “enablement-based approach would eliminate the need for the § 101
operability requirement [and] . . . would also streamline patent examination, improve patent quality, yield
more technically robust patents, and ultimately foster innovation”); Jacob Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of
Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1137 (2014) (arguing that courts should analyze eligibility within the
context of a patent’s specification and claims).
125
Risch, supra note 122, at 595. This type of technical expertise is precisely why the concept of a
person having ordinary skill in the technical arts (PHOSITA), plays such a role in other patentability criteria.
See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007) (applying the PHOSITA analysis to nonobviousness criteria).
126
Risch, supra note 122, at 595.
123
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of creating categories not devised by statute.127 But instead of recognizing
these restrictions, judges have consistently jumped to subject matter analysis
when another eligibility criterion could work instead. For example, in the case
of Parker v. Flook, the patent at issue sought to cover a method determining
the variables for automobile catalytic converters, triggering an alarm based
upon mathematical algorithms for acceptable limits.128 However, instead of
deciding that the invention was incorrectly described, the Court decided the
case by saying that an “algorithm cannot be novel” because it is a “basic tool[]
of scientific and technological work.”129
To fight the confusion among patentability criteria, especially the
vagueness of subject matter requirements, Risch proposes what he calls
“rigorous patentability.”130 Importantly, this approach gives relatively little
weight to the subject matter criterion and attempts to do away with the
moratorium on all “law[s] of nature,”131 arguing instead for broad statutory
categories and the ability for other criteria to make up for the slack.132
Rigorous patentability would agree with the Court’s judgment in Alice, for
example, but disagree with the majority opinion that the result follows due to a
laws of nature type analysis—rather, tax methods “would be considered
obvious,” and “automation alone is not patentable unless the means for
automation are novel and nonobvious.”133 Similarly, an algorithm alone has no
“practical utility,” so allowing algorithms to survive the murky subject matter
tests will not simply result in thousands of patents on algorithms.134 As other
scholars have noted, such a misplaced focus on a laws of nature analysis
127
Id. (“Of course, broad congressional action that suffers from the same problems as judicial opinions
may not be desirable.”).
128
437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978).
129
Risch, supra note 122, at 604 (quoting Flook, 437 U.S. at 584 (1978)). Flook, along with Gottschalk
v. Benson, has become known as a precedential basis for presenting patentability concerns toward algorithms
based on a laws of nature analysis. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–
72 (1972)). It seems odd to compare early computers, which truly performed merely faster versions of penand-paper work, with modern computers, which can use decades of advancements in machine learning theory
to not merely perform a human function faster, but in fact allow an altogether new type of calculation or even
invent new calculations itself. Cf. Ben Hattenbach & Joshua Glucoft, Patents in an Era of Infinite Monkeys
and Artificial Intelligence, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 32, 34 (2015) (arguing that machine learning has led to
computer-created creative material, questioning the necessity of human ingenuity in the patentability analysis).
130
Risch, supra note 122, at 606.
131
Id. at 607. Again, such laws, even if they existed, only serve to muddle the patentability analysis. See
supra Section I.A.2 (discussing the issues presented by the patentability of algorithms).
132
Risch, supra note 122, at 607.
133
Id. at 612 (citing Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 230 (1976)). While the Court in Dann held
automation of bookkeeping to be obvious, the connection to the Alice case a few years later is quite clear. See
Dann, 425 U.S. at 230.
134
Risch, supra note 122, at 622–23.
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prevents the courts from utilizing the more developed jurisprudence found in
other patent eligibility criteria.135 Lower courts have made similar arguments,
even if the Supreme Court has yet to see the confusion caused by the laws of
nature focus.136
A shift away from subject matter eligibility and toward the more developed
areas of patent eligibility is in accord with Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm model
and with a more descriptive view of scientific research. The Court developed
its moratorium on all “laws of nature,” “natural phenomena,” and “products of
nature” primarily out of a search for an “easily administered proxy” for the
“building-blocks” of scientific research, which it wanted to remove from
patentability.137 But this sort of proxy breeds more confusion than it resolves.
Even if laws of nature worked according to classical, scientific realism
standards, they are nearly impossible to use as guideposts.138 Even if one
supposes the existence of underlying true facts in the physical universe,
identifying what truly represents a law of nature proposes a far more complex
question.139 For instance, can a biological circumstance created by the
randomness of evolution be such a law? Such a correlation hardly seems a law
of nature; when compared to concepts like laws of gravitational motion,
biological correlations differ vastly in that they are neither static nor
predetermined by earlier facts.140
135
See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an “Article of
Manufacture:” Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 89, 93 (1998)
(“[F]ailure to clearly and properly define the actual nature of software inventions by applying the patentable
subject matter analysis leads to inadequate identification of prior art and insufficiently stringent review for
novelty and non-obviousness.”).
136
See, e.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (1998) (arguing
that instead of focusing on which category of invention in which the patent belongs, that the correct analysis
should focus on “the essential characteristics of the subject matter, in particular, its practical utility” and that
“[s]ection 101 specifies that statutory subject matter must also satisfy the other ‘conditions and requirements’
of Title 35, including novelty, nonobviousness, and adequacy of disclosure and notice”).
137
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 89 (2012) (declining to establish
any distinction between types of laws of nature based on philosophical or scientific inquiry, rigorous or
otherwise).
138
The traditional definition of a law of nature can be taken from David Hume, who described it as “a
constant conjunction” combined with causation, where B must always follow A. Sherkow, supra note 124, at
1159 (citing THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 506 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005)). The problem
of induction raised by this definition is not explored here because it is tangential to this Comment’s application
of Kuhn’s historical philosophy of science perspective to the patent-law system.
139
See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (“It only confuses the issue, however, to introduce such terms as ‘the work of nature’ and the
‘laws of nature.’ For these are vague and malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and
equivocation.”).
140
Sherkow, supra note 124, at 1158 (citing NICHOLAS RESCHER, COMPLEXITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL
OVERVIEW 50–52 (1998)) (describing the growth of scientific research, information, spending, and facilities).
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In fact, the sort of laws of nature presupposed by the Court in Mayo align
better with Kuhn’s paradigm model, even though by adopting such a model the
terminology must change dramatically. Although there are no underlying laws
of nature scattered about the world, waiting to be uncovered,141 each paradigm
we enter shifts our scientific language so dramatically that if our predecessors
were to encounter a word such as “electron,” for example, it would not mean
anything to them at all.142 In fact, such a time traveler would need to undergo
the gestalt shift called for by Kuhn to even be taught.143
Despite Kuhn’s framework providing a better vehicle for the approach
taken by the Court, the fact remains that the current jurisprudence surrounding
subject matter eligibility is deeply flawed in its inability to capture how science
actually proceeds. The central purpose of a scientific paradigm is to increase
problem-solving power.144 This idea becomes clearest when one realizes that
scientific revolutions happen and paradigms shift because a new paradigm can
solve more problems than the previous one.145
Applying this focus on problem solving to the eligibility fight is tricky. On
one hand, the paradigm model is not easily applied to mathematics because
math has never been grounded in physical necessity, but has been constructed
by academia for thousands of years.146 On the other hand, in a field such as
141
NANCY CARTWRIGHT, Fitting Facts to Equations, in HOW THE LAWS OF PHYSICS LIE 128, 129 (1983)
(“[N]ature is not governed by simple quantitative equations of the kind we write in our fundamental
theories. . . . [F]undamental equations do not govern objects in reality; they govern only objects in models.”).
142
See KUHN, supra note 5, at 110 (“[P]aradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their
research-engagement differently. . . . [W]e may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a
different world.”).
143
Id. at 110 (“Only after a number of such transformations of vision does the student become an
inhabitant of the scientist’s world, seeing what the scientist sees and responding as the scientist does.”). Kuhn
was describing the general student of science, but it applies equally to our make-believe time traveler.
“Gestalt” is typically used to describe the shift in view discussed by Kuhn. Id. at 85 (describing how a
scientist’s vision of the world flips); cf. Jonathan Corum, Is That Dress White and Gold or Blue and Black,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/02/28/science/white-or-blue-dress.html;
Eric W. Weisstein, Young Woman-Old Woman Illusion, WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, http://mathworld.wolfram.
com/YoungGirl-OldWomanIllusion.html (last updated Dec. 21, 2017). The white-and-gold or blue-and-black
dress controversy shook social media with a modern-day question of gestalt, when some individuals only saw
one perspective, some only another, but some were able to gradually refocus their eyes to see the dress from
either perspective. For Kuhn, a more typical example would be the shift from classical mechanics into
quantum mechanics.
144
See supra notes 96, 99 and accompanying text (discussing paradigms as methods of puzzle-solving).
145
See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Interestingly though, these shifts can never take place
through rational argumentation. See KUHN, supra note 5, at 99 (arguing that reason alone is not enough to
cause a paradigm shift, but that other factors, including, but not limited to, the natural turnover of scientists in
the field, contribute to a revolution).
146
See Sherkow, supra note 124, at 1161 (quoting John Beatty, The Evolutionary Contingency Thesis, in
CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND RATIONALITY IN THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 45, 46–47 (Gereon Wolters et al. eds.,
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biotechnology, which seems to have existed in a steady paradigm since the
adoption of DNA theory, the problem-solving power comes from the
correlations discovered between DNA, cDNA, and other basic cell
reproductive building blocks.147
From the perspective of philosophy of science, this comparison directly
highlights the differences between “necessary” and “contingent” facts.
Necessary facts are those axiomatically true, like mathematical relationships;
whereas contingent facts, such as the biological correlations mentioned above,
could have turned out differently had evolution taken an alternative route.148
Contingent facts should not be barred from patentability merely because they
are contingent, but rather because they do not satisfy every patent requirement;
for example, a biological correlation will not always be “useful” or “well
described.” Such an analysis allows those other areas of the patentability
analysis to step in where subject matter eligibility fails.
C. The Audience of a Paradigm
Having generally explained the importance of relying upon other criteria of
the patentability analysis due to the murkiness inherent in determining subject
matter eligibility, this section now highlights how one of those criteria—
written description—serves to both fulfill the goals of Kuhn’s paradigm model
and present a better method for adjudicating patentability.
Approaching patent eligibility from the perspective of its audience—a
community of inventors—is best done by avoiding vague formulations. These
formulations subsequently create “virtual distance between the source of a
legal pronouncement and its ultimate intended audience,”149 like the Court’s
current “eligibility-as-king” trend.150 Ultimately, an “enablement-based
approach” should be employed to mitigate the effects of distance to the
audience.151
1995)) (arguing that the “complexity of biological diversity is, after all, simply the product of historical
accident,” making it merely “contingently true” as opposed to axiomatically or necessarily true, like math).
147
For a discussion of the differences between types of DNA, see generally Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013). Despite this discussion, the opinion’s focus on
determining subject matter eligibility seems ultimately misguided.
148
See supra note 147.
149
Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective, supra note 1, at 360 (positing that the game of telephone
currently taking place between Congress, the courts, patentees at court, and the industry at large defeats the
goals of the patent system).
150
Id. at 377.
151
See id. at 373 (arguing that conducting subject matter analysis without involving claim construction
creates a missed “opportunity to formulate eligibility rules that can be more predictably translated into
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One way to reduce this problem is to push back on the eligibility-as-kingstyle analysis in favor of more consistent written description legwork on the
part of judges. The most obvious recent instance of this issue appeared in
Mayo. In Mayo, the Court paid lip service152 to the idea of interpreting claims
as a whole, but instead looked only at the patent’s first claim.153 The Court
concluded that the claim “recit[ed] a law of nature” and followed up this
determination with a search for an “inventive concept.”154 Because the claim
merely recited a correlation, the Court subsequently found that it did not add
enough to the law of nature to transform the claim into a patent-eligible
application of the law.155
Mayo shows the deep flaws with the eligibility-as-king-style analysis.
Putting aside the issues presented earlier concerning laws of nature and their
dubious existence,156 the selection of only one claim in a patent for an
inventive concept search differs greatly from a thorough examination of the
claims both individually and as a whole.157 The tunnel vision of focusing on
subject matter eligibility led the Court in both Mayo and Alice to issue its
judgments “without the need to qualify any single piece of evidence as prior art
or consult the immense jurisprudence of Sections 102 or 103.”158
Certainly, the work of Paul Feyerabend cuts against such a simple
dismissal by the Alice Court. If all science proceeds irrationally,159 how can
something ever be routine? Characterizing the invention in a case as a
practical guidance for the research community”); Seymore, supra note 124, at 1495 (arguing that an
“enablement-based approach . . . would also streamline patent examination, improve patent quality, yield more
technically robust patents, and ultimately foster innovation”).
152
Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective, supra note 1, at 373 n.126; see also id. at 373 (“[I]t is
problematic to formulate eligibility rules in a vacuum, without regard for the inevitable interaction between
those rules and other inquiries, such as claim construction.”).
153
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75 (2012) (“For present purposes
we may assume that the other claims in the patents do not differ significantly from claim 1.”).
154
Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective, supra note 1, at 378.
155
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77 (“[D]o the patent claims add enough to their statements of the correlations to
allow the processes they describe to qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws? We believe
that the answer to this question is no.”).
156
See supra Section II.B.1.
157
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l., 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (2014) (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012)); see also Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective,
supra note 1, at 379 (noting that the “inventive concept” analysis allows the Court to combine patentability
criteria in such a way that some criteria are not considered fully). Holbrook and Janis apply a similar analysis
to Alice, in which the court held that “[t]aking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the
computer at each step of the process is ‘[p]urely conventional.’” Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359).
158
Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective, supra note 1, at 379.
159
See supra note 107 (describing Feyerabend’s theory of scientific change).
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straightforward application of a business deal160 completely misses how
science truly proceeds, with years of random guessing, trial and error, or
serendipitous discovery.
The most pressing evidence against eligibility-as-king analysis comes from
one of its central tenets: a patentable subject matter “must represent more than
a trivial appendix to the underlying abstract idea.”161 How can one begin to
make such a judgment without first completing a claim analysis then taking
steps to truly understand the elements at issue and how they work together to
develop an inventive idea? By stepping away from the vague standards of
subject matter eligibility and focusing on the more robust written description
analysis, patent law jurisprudence can better align with the scientific endeavor.

D. Application of Paradigm Science to Alice and Post-Alice Decisions
Finally, this Comment concludes with an application of loosened subject
matter eligibility to the recent decisions in Alice and McRO. Alice need not
turn out differently under the type of analysis proposed in this Comment. It is
entirely consistent with paradigm science and the absence of true laws of
nature that the settlement risk mitigation patent in Alice be ruled invalid.
However, such a decision would recognize that, under Kuhn’s philosophy, the
transcription of mathematical formulas could not be rejected from patentability
wholesale, since laws only survive under the paradigm effecting them.162 For
example, most purely algorithmic patents could be knocked out using utility,
since math on its own does not seem to fulfill a purposeful societal function.163
While Alice’s patent goes a step beyond a pure algorithm,164 it seems worth the
Court’s time to examine the inventive step under utility grounds instead of a
shoehorned subject matter eligibility analysis. Alternatively, if the Court
pursued a stronger written description analysis, as advocated by Holbrook,165 a
claim-by-claim analysis would aid discussion under utility or any ruling
available to the Court. Either way, such arguments are significantly bolstered
by the work laid down by Kuhn and Feyerabend, and would more closely align
160

The Court did this in Alice. See 134 S. Ct. at 2359.
CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Lourie, J.,
concurring), aff’d, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
162
See supra Section II.B.1.
163
See supra Section I.B.1.
164
The Alice Court may not agree with this statement, since it states unequivocally that the claims
“merely require generic computer implementation.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357. However, as discussed below,
even generic computer implementation is often hardly anything but straightforward, and certainly involves
more than a simple recitation of formulas.
165
See supra Section III.C.
161
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with the way practicing scientists view their own work; our current scientific
truths are only scientific truths until the next revolution arrives.
A few post-Alice opinions from the Federal Circuit have realized the
necessity of dodging the subject-matter-eligibility question and subsequent
inventive concept inquiry.166 Instead of balking at the mere mention of an
algorithm, the Federal Circuit in McRO decided to wade into the depths of the
patent’s specification.167 By refusing to focus on a vague inventive concept
analysis, the McRO court determined that the patent had not been preempted
based upon the “subjective determinations” of the animator, rather than merely
applying mathematical laws.168
Such a conclusion is no surprise to anyone with even a beginner’s
knowledge of computer code. An implementation of simple multiplication or
exponential regression requires very little subjective input on the part of the
coder. However, algorithms can be implemented thousands of ways; the name
“algorithm” does not imply that a fundamental law of nature is being used
generically. If a software company devotes countless resources to devising a
new method for finding large primes, preventing them from getting a patent
(and thereby discouraging disclosure) does not serve the goal of technological
advancement.
The Federal Circuit’s decision in McRO makes three implicit arguments, as
pointed out by Robert Sachs on Bilski Blog.169 Subject matter eligibility, as the
opinion notes, does not “require a method to ‘be tied to a machine or transform
an article.’”170 Importantly, the McRO opinion implicitly criticizes the
inventive step approach from Alice as not focusing enough on the specific
claim limitations.171
Other courts have been less subtle about their criticism of the inventive
step approach. In California Institute of Technology. v. Hughes
Communications Inc.,172 the court painstakingly traversed the patent claim by
166
See, e.g., DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1255–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(analyzing the interactions between a patent’s claims to find that the patent claimed eligible subject matter
beyond mere abstraction).
167
See McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1311–16 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
168
Id. at 1314.
169
Sachs, supra note 56.
170
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315 (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010)).
171
See Sachs, supra note 56 (citing McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313) (“Whether at step one or step two of the
Alice test, in determining the patentability of a method, a court must look to the claims as an ordered
combination, without ignoring the requirements of the individual steps.”).
172
59 F. Supp. 3d 974 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
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claim, finding each to contain “inventive concepts that make them
patentable.”173 Additionally, Judge Pfaelzer noted that although Alice failed to
clarify when software patents survive a § 101 analysis, courts cannot presume
that software patents are prima facie ineligible because “courts should not read
into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not
expressed.” The opinion concludes with an argument that “[t]he Supreme
Court in the future may provide a clearer outline for applying § 101 to
software, but to this Court, it at least must be true that § 101 protects a unique
computing solution that addresses a unique computing problem.”174 This sort
of analysis, looking to the uniqueness of the problem and the problem’s
solution, certainly aligns with Holbrook’s view that the Court ought to rely
more upon the patent’s specification and claim construction, rather than
adhering to a vague inventive step.175 Instead of assuming a linearly
progressing science with discoverable laws of nature, a reliance upon the
specific problem-solving aspects of the invention would cause the Court to
shift focus toward the more-helpful paradigm view espoused by Kuhn. By
loosening the restrictions on subject matter eligibility and instead relying upon
the forgotten requirement of utility or robustly detailed analysis of written
description, the courts can better develop a patent law jurisprudence that
matches the reality of science.
CONCLUSION
Like many areas of constitutionally based law, the patent system suffers
from the inability of its creators to foresee future developments in science. Yet
unlike, for example, the Fourth Amendment’s new application in an era of
drone surveillance, the area of patent law has also been fundamentally
challenged by developments in philosophy.
Since the 1970s, innovations in both biotechnology and computer software
have plagued courts. Although initially “anything under the sun” seemed to be
patentable,176 the Supreme Court has repeatedly backpedaled, recently arriving
at a vague inventive step model in the cases of Mayo and Alice.177 This
analysis moves away from the original goal of subject matter eligibility, which
173

Id. at 974, 993–1000.
Id. at 1000.
175
Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective, supra note 1, at 379. Holbrook does not hide his disdain
for the Alice construction: “The purpose of identifying the inventive concept, aside from jettisoning claim
construction . . . .” Id. at 381 (emphasis added).
176
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
177
See supra notes 21, 37 and accompanying text.
174
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sought to prevent preemption of innovation, and has instead prompted judges
to engage in a formless discussion of the type of problem to be addressed and
how the market has been addressing it. Such questions are arguably important
to patentability, but the idea that they somehow belong in a subject matter
eligibility analysis offends and discards other areas of the validity analysis. For
example, Timothy Holbrook argued that if such questions are to be examined,
certainly at least a claim analysis should take place, and data concerning the
knowledge of the PHOSITA should be examined.178 Recently, the Federal
Circuit decided McRO, in which a claim analysis did result in a finding of
validity, due to a recognition that inventiveness was present in the creation of
an algorithm.179 Not all algorithms are created equal, and nearly all algorithms
that reach beyond the basics of mathematics involve at least some level of
human creativity.180 Such algorithms, and by symmetry, such humandiscovered biological mechanisms, should be analyzed on their claims or
perhaps under utility analysis to determine validity instead of being
immediately cast aside as being too basic or close to a law of nature.
Thomas Kuhn presents a historically founded, anti-realist, and eminently
non-linear view of scientific progress in his work The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. In doing so, he paints a picture of science adamantly at odds with
the assumptions underlying the Supreme Court’s views in Mayo and Alice. The
inventive step advocated for in those cases fails to correctly grasp how the
scientific endeavor truly works. Such a focus on the inventiveness of a patent
seems far too vague a standard. In fact, if the work of Paul Feyerabend is to be
given any credit, the scientific endeavor cannot simply be characterized by any
one method or process, especially not one aimed at inventiveness at all.
By adjusting the validity analysis to loosen the filter of subject matter
eligibility, the courts can more appropriately use frameworks provided by both
utility and written description requirements. This refocusing will encourage

178

Holbrook & Janis, An Audience Perspective, supra note 1, at 372 n.123.
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
180
Importantly, algorithms are the ultimate puzzle-solvers. Discovering new ways to solve puzzles is a
key component of Kuhn’s paradigm model, and giving more attention to the patentability of algorithms as
opposed to a blanket opposition, as Alice has encouraged, will both further the existing paradigms and could
even incentivize the onset of new revolutions.
179
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more in-depth analysis of the mythical “person who is skilled in the arts,”
causing expert witness testimony to play a key role. Bringing real scientists
into the fore when determining patent validity will better align the patent
system with a descriptivist view of science and reduce current confusion at
lower courts.
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